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| SUMMARY   |
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
|       | SOVIET UNION                                 |   |  |  |
|-------|--|---|--|--|
| 1     | . USSR mo                                    | oves long-range submarines to Far East:   |  |  |
| 25X1A | course a<br>the first<br>East and            | According to the Office of Naval Intelligence, at least five submarines, probably boats of the two new long- range classes, have transited the sea route and, on 2 October, were on a southerly long the east coast of the Kurile Islands. These are improved postwar submarines to arrive in the Far the first submarines since 1950 to be moved to Far waters via the northern sea route. |  |  |
|       | route inc<br>Far East<br>increase<br>more ra | Comment: The deployment of five ness from western USSR via the difficult northern sea creases long-range submarine strength in the Soviet to by 25 percent. It may also reflect a Soviet plan to offensive naval strength in the Pacific Ocean Fleet pidly than production facilities in the Far East will  |  |  |
|       | allow.                                       |   |  |  |
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the British for agreement on the Suez base have reached "two final road blocks." Certain customs arrangements and responsibility for housing British technicians are the unresolved issues.

Comment: According to Cairo press reports, the formal signing of the final agreement has been tentatively scheduled for 11 October. Negotiating teams have been attempting to reach final settlement since 27 July, when the "Agreement on Principles" covering the British evacuation of the base was signed.

## 5. Libyan king reported considering abdication:

The American legation in Tripoli believes that King Idriss may be seriously considering abdication as a result of the 5 October assassination of Ibrahim Shalhi, his adviser and close companion for 40 years.

Idriss unexpectedly summoned Crown Prince Rida and Prime
Minister Ben Halim to a meeting at Tobruk. Official British speculation on the purpose of the meeting is that Idriss may desire to abdicate and believes that it can be arranged more easily at Tobruk, from where he could proceed at once to Egypt.

Comment: Idriss has always shown disinterest in the duties and responsibilities of his office. It is, accordingly, possible that the shock following the murder of his intimate adviser may influence him to renounce his office.

Idriss' abdication would bring to the Libyan throne his 64-year-old half brother, Sayyid Muhammad Rida, a weak and ineffectual individual, who would do little to strengthen the position of the monarchy in Libya.

Until more evidence becomes available, however, this report must be treated with reservation.

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## WESTERN EUROPE

6. Adenauer's coalition partners reluctantly support London agreements:

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Chancellor Adenauer won parliamentary approval for the London agreements only by using "strong pressure" on the Christian Democrats' coalition partners, according to Ambassador Conant in Bonn.

A majority of the Refugee Party wanted to withhold approval until the chancellor clarified his policies on the Saar and reunification. A "knockdown, drag-out battle" took place in the ranks of the Free Democratic Party before the 7 October Bundestag foreign policy debate. Although Free Democratic chairman Dehler was finally forced into line, a Christian Democratic spokesman questioned how long his loyalty to the coalition would last.

Comment: Adenauer will probably have considerable difficulty in maintaining his coalition solidarity, particularly if the French make further demands for safeguards. In an effort to gain greater popular support, the minor coalition parties are becoming more nationalistic and independent than previously.

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